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Paper Abstract

Balancing Act: The U.S. Military's Reliance on Contractors to Fulfill Operational-Level Logistical Requirements
This paper examines an overreliance on contractors by the U.S. military. During the past 15 years (1999-2014) the U.S. military has grown accustomed to using contractors to perform a large majority of logistical functions when executing operational-level logistics.
Without budget constraints, the U. This paper examines the overreliance on contractors the U.S. military has grown accustomed to in planning and executing operational-level logistics while acknowledging this as an emerging challenge that necessitates an achievable, appropriate balance in the force structure for future operations. In the modern-day environment of ample Overseas 
BACKGROUND
The U.S. military in its efforts to support multiple, complex operational-level conflicts has depended on contracted support from U.S. companies, host nations, and third country nationals for logistical support and sustainment efforts. This is largely due to the fact that the military does not possess the organic capacity to perform all logistical functions required to sustain our forces across the globe. 2 Contractors provide augmentation to U.S.
military forces performing logistical functions and allowing for more combat forces to be deployed into operational areas. 3 In addition, U.S. military logistics organizations lack some of the capacity and capabilities to conduct support and sustainment operations during multiple protracted conflicts which increases potential logistics shortfalls and risks early culmination at the operational-level. In order to rapidly make up for these shortfalls, the U.S.
military has turned to contractors to fill logistical support and sustainment requirements. 
OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
Deployment and distribution, as outlined in JP 4-0, focuses on the necessity to rapidly deploy, execute, and sustain operations globally in order to fully support the Joint Forces Commander (JFC). 14 The goal is to reduce the logistics footprint while providing the JFC with flexible options to employ forces in time and space. The two principle ways to accomplished this is through a highly effective deployment process to "Move the Force" and an extremely efficient distribution process to "Sustain the Force". 15 Both processes rely heavily on contractor resources to move and sustain personnel, equipment, and supplies to and throughout the operational area. More than 90% of the equipment and supplies necessary for the JFC to conduct operations is shipped by contracted commercial carriers. 21 The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is responsible for the sealift of deployment equipment necessary for the JFC to build and sustain combat potential in theater. The MSC possesses the capability, via the sealift program (PM5), to move deployment equipment but relies on contracted carriers to expand its capacity in order to meet the transportation demands of the JFC to deploy into an operational area. 22 The MSC's sealift program utilizes a mix of government-owned, long-term-chartered, 
In order to
OPERATIONAL MAINTENANCE
Maintenance operations, as summarized from JP 4-0, provide system readiness to the JFC. The maintenance strategy utilized by the Joint Forces relies on a mix of depot and field level maintenance to improve freedom of action and sustain the readiness of the JFCs combat potential. 25 Depot maintenance is predominately conducted outside of the operational area at large fixed facilities and exists to perform tasks unable to be conducted at the field maintenance level. 26 Field maintenance utilizes a strong contracted workforce located at the operational-level and directly supports the JFC. These operations are imperative to combat operations, for example in support of OEF and OIF $2.4 billion was obligated from FY02 to FY11 in support of contracted field maintenance in the operational areas. 27 The main purpose of field maintenance is to repair equipment and systems necessary for day-to-day operations as quickly as possible. 28 Field maintenance is directly responsible for building combat potential in the operational area by ensuring equipment and systems are in the highest state of readiness to meet JFC requirements. 30 Contractors were used to fill this gap while U.S. military personnel received maintenance training. Even after maintenance personnel received training, the high density per unit, overall numbers of the new MRAPs, and high OPTEMPO of forces required continued contracted field maintenance support forward in the operational area.
Contracted field maintenance provides not only common maintenance actions like vehicle services, but they also provide a needed surge capability when there are periods of increased damage to vehicles and equipment due to enemy engagements. This surge capability increases field maintenance capacity allowing military and contracted field maintenance personnel to ensure combat systems and equipment are quickly repaired to enable the JFC to have the highest combat potential at all times. Additionally, the use of 
OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS SERVICES
Logistics services, another primary function necessary in supporting operational-level conflicts, is described in JP 4-0 as the critical life support capabilities that allow the Joint Forces to sustain themselves while forward deployed in the operational area. These services include food, comprised also by water and ice, and base and installation, which also includes hygiene services. 33 Logistics services provided to the Joint Force during major combat personnel. In addition to CLF vessels no longer being crewed by Navy military personnel, the MSC also utilizes contracted commercial helicopters to conduct aerial replenishment during CLF sustainment operations. 40 The alternative to receiving logistics services from CLF assets is to conduct port calls at foreign locations in the operational area. The Navy relies on contractors to provide husbandry services when conducting port calls outside of U.S. Naval bases within an operational area. 41 Husbandry services provide the following; trash removal, sewage removal, potable water, pilot, tug and line handlers, water ferry/taxi service, oil waste removal, and provisions. 42 Logistical services provided by the CLF and port calls are essential to allow the Navy's fleet to remain at sea and operate forward in the operational area.
Current Joint Force distributions into forward operational areas has necessitated a reliance on contractors to provide critical food and base logistical services. Without contracted support for logistics support and services, the JFC's flexibility and sustainability to conduct protracted, widely dispersed operations would be limited. Large FOBs, APODs, and
SPODs would be unable to be maintained without the critical capabilities and capacities that contracted resources provide to logistics services. Degraded logistics services would limit operational reach and create the potential for early culmination if the Joint Force cannot be supported and sustained during complex operational-level conflicts on a global scale.
COUNTER-ARGUMENT
Some might argue that complex operational-level conflicts can be adequately Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, the military was able to successfully support and sustain itself while only utilizing an estimated one contractor for every 100 service personnel deployed. 44 The effective mobilization of the Army Reserves made up 24 percent of the total Army ground forces. 45 The substantial logistical augmentation that
Reserves units provide can significantly decrease or potentially even eliminate the need for contractors in the operational area. where the staff is tasked to create an Operational Contract Support staff estimate in support of the planning process. 46 During operations with force constraints, the judicious employment of contractors to perform logistical functions can allow the operational commander to deploy more combat forces. In addition, the use of contractors in performing garrison type logistical functions on bases in a deployed environment enables the U.S.
military to widely forward distribute its logistical forces more effectively at the tactical level.
Although the conflict in Iraq has ended and Afghanistan is drawing down, the requirements to support and sustain the operational-level commander during future conflicts will not diminish. The future operating environment will continue to pose a myriad of challenges to our forces, from protracted conflicts and operations in harsh environments to widely dispersed operational areas and hybrid warfare. A shrinking U.S. military will not waiver in its intrinsic mission of defending the nation and projecting power forward. The need for operational-level commanders to project power on a global scale comes with immense logistical requirements that must be adequately supported and sustained. Future conflicts must continue to use contractors and contracted resources as force multipliers in conjunction with organic logistical forces to ensure that operational-level commanders have the ability to deploy forces quickly, the longevity to sustain the force during protracted operations, and the operational reach to prevent culmination due to inadequate logistics.
